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Introductions  
I. Assessing Interest Group Politics in EU 
Governance 
 
Dirk De Bièvre 
University of Antwerp 
 
 
The literature on interest group politics in the European Union has come of 
age. The last ten years we have seen a remarkable shift from a literature 
consisting of mainly empirics driven studies that remained detached from 
sophisticated conceptual reflection, to a firmly theory-informed field of 
empirical political science. The study of EU interest group politics has 
become more professionalised, as researchers have moved away from studies 
that had their merits on their own but often suffered from theoretical 
grandstanding or idiosyncratic topics and/or sui generis explanations, to 
studies that link theoretical and conceptual development with sound 
empirical hypothesis testing.1 The reason for this transformation is to be 
sought in changes in the discipline of political science and adjacent 
disciplines, but certainly just as well in the transformation of European 
                                                 
1 I remember but too well going to my PhD supervisor Daniel Verdier during my first year of 
research in 1997, telling him hesitantly that I had failed to spot The literature on EU interest 
representation. Was his reaction: “Of course you didn’t find any! Because there IS no such 
literature!” Fortunately, Daniel’s hyperbolic quip is no longer right. 
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politics with its decline of electoral party politics and the migration of the 
‘authoritative allocation of values’ into policy networks and negotiation 
systems in which interest groups and civil society organisations assume 
prominent positions.  
As a result of this development, researchers in the field of interest group 
politics have found it rewarding to exchange their ideas, draft papers, and/or 
finished research projects in the framework of the Connex Research Group 
‘Civil society and interest representation in EU-governance’. In this 
introduction, I select some of the findings on biased representation and 
influence, add some reflections coming out of discussions within the research 
group, and draw out lines for future research. I mostly rely on two special 
issues of academic journals that came about in the framework of Connex 
workshops on interest group politics. The first one is small in scope and size 
but youthfully immodest in ambition: a special issue of Journal of Public Policy 
(JPP) on ‘Interest group influence in Europe and the United States’ (Dür and 
De Bièvre 2007). The second one is more encompassing in depth and 
breadth of issues covered, as well as the product of more seasoned scholars: a 
special issue of West European Politics (WEP) entitled ‘Interest group politics in 
Europe. Lessons from EU Studies and Comparative Politics’, edited by Jan 
Beyers, Rainer Eising, and William Maloney.  
Normativity and bias in interest group politics 
research 
A first thought that comes to mind when overviewing the activities of this 
diverse group of scholars is their unease with the term ‘civil society’. Policy 
practitioners often use the term civil society for NGOs, diffuse or public 
interests, and social movement organisations in a ameliorative sense, thereby 
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attributing a pejorative connotation to terms such as business interests, 
employers organisations, and special interest organisations (for a more 
thorough discussion, see Beyers, Eising and Maloney, forthcoming). In 
research however, such a normatively laden word usage reveals itself as 
inhibiting, rather than stimulating comparative research. For instance, in 
which box of the dichotomy would we have to place trade unions? Are they 
civil society organisations in the ‘good’ sense? Or are they special interest 
group organisations in as far as in wage negotiations they represent members 
at the detriment of non-members and the unemployed? Although 
practitioners engaged in political conflict may well benefit from bracketing 
their interlocutors in terms of bad and good guys, one of the golden rules of 
categorisation in research is to avoid a priori value judgements regarding 
particular categories, but rather to make the attribution of value judgements 
dependent on the research question at hand. But even if we have adopted a 
particular working definition and think we have defined concepts like civil 
society organisations, interest groups, or social movements, words keep their 
normatively laden touch. Closeness to usage by public actors, however, is 
likely to make research uncritical and therefore less useful for practitioners 
and academic observers alike. 
Due to the positive connotation that the term civil society conjures up, many 
scholars have deliberately avoided using it. They have surely not done so in 
order to remove the question of normativity from the agenda. On the 
contrary, it remains central to the research endeavour in its importance for 
the formulation of research questions. One of the most prominent 
motivations to do research on interest groups is the question of bias – bias in 
representation, as well as bias in influence on policy outcomes. We ascribe 
meaning to it by establishing a measuring rod of what we think unbiased 
representation and unbiased influence would look like. The trouble is that we 
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often do not know what such an ideal Platonic polity, and set of policies, 
would be. In order to escape this essentialist trap, we look for reference 
points in other political systems. We compare political systems with more bias 
to those with less bias. We do not compare a system with bias to one without 
bias, as we are bound to view any political system as some type of mobilisation 
of bias (Schattschneider 1960).  
The assumption that access and inclusion can be taken as proxies for groups’ 
likely impact on policy outcomes, is not validated in empirical research on 
European trade policy. In this policy field, NGOs have recently gained access 
to policy-makers, but have largely failed to shift policy outcomes in their 
favour. This does not result from an overwhelming presence of focused 
producer interests or their lack of expert knowledge, but may well be 
explained by their lack of resources to diminish or enhance the chances of 
political actors to be re-elected or re-appointed (Dür and De Bièvre 2007b).  
With respect to the EU, Beyers, Eising and Maloney point out that even the 
comparison of relative values of bias is tricky, since some types of interest 
groups may not feel the need to mobilise on the European level as EU 
competencies in particular policy fields may be weak or non-existent (Beyers, 
Eising and Maloney 2008). And as the contribution by William Maloney to 
this volume shows, we might find some forms of bias actually very desirable 
in cases where these organisations defend interests of people that out of 
themselves will hardly mobilise, or in the case of the better informed, because 
they tend be more tolerant. In sum, research on bias is likely to stay on the 
agenda in a prominent way, especially if we try and tackle the tricky issue of 
sampling the relevant population of individuals, interests, and organisations. 
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Stages in the policy process and EU – US 
comparisons 
There seems large agreement among the researchers in the Connex 
workshops that the segmentation of the policy cycle is a very useful antidote 
to vague and unfalsifiable generalisations about interest group politics. In a 
remarkable contribution to the WEP special issue, Lowery, Poppelaars and 
Berkhout discuss the advantages of this approach extensively (Lowery, 
Poppelaars and Berkhout 2008). They distinguish the following stages in 
what they call the influence production process: the mobilisation of 
individual organised interests, their interactions within interest systems, their 
influence activities, and their consequences for policy. They show how such a 
segmentation can encourage the development and testing of middle-range 
theories, be they on conditions for collective action, the development of 
strategies, the formation of networks or coalitions or the influence on policy 
outcomes, to name but a few of the dependent variables that research in the 
special issues has focused on.  
While extolling the benefits of splitting the policy cycle into comparable 
units, Lowery et al. are far less upbeat about the merits and feasibility of EU – 
US comparisons. Surprisingly so, since they might just as well have concluded 
in a modestly optimistic way that, given the caveats, they have provided 
useful strategies to pursue this route in future research. Surprisingly also, since 
in the same issue the contribution by Baumgartner and Mahoney illustrates a 
convergence of perspectives on interest-group research in Europe and 
America (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008). They discuss how studies have 
increasingly focussed on the impact of government structures on mobilisation, 
the locus of advocacy and interest group strategies on both sides of the 
Atlantic. And in a contribution to the JPP special issue Christine Mahoney 
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illustrates how such comparisons across different political systems can fulfil 
their promise of interesting results (Mahoney 2007).  
Relevance and feasibility: what should we be 
studying? 
A third striking point has been the difference in opinion about what 
constitutes the most relevant and feasible object of study in interest group 
politics. Some are sceptical about studying influence. Is influence not 
researchable enough and should we study participation and representation 
instead? Or should we restrict ourselves to interest group strategies for the 
same reason? Should we focus less on lobbying activities of organisations, 
since much of what organisations do is not lobbying but management of their 
organisational maintenance? The participation in consultations may be 
attractive for gathering information and expertise, for cultivating political 
networks, and for enhancing public visibility vis-à-vis key constituencies. Still 
others are sceptical about studying cleavages, since by doing so you risk 
reducing politics to conflict between rival groups about the allocation of 
resources, whereas conflict may not be pervasive in many sub-fields of the 
polity. A simple answer to these controversies would be that all possible 
strands have their merits and will merrily complement each other, but 
unfortunately, such a simple answer will not do. To take but one example, 
the introduction to the JPP special issue (reprinted in this volume) and the 
contribution of Andreas Dür to the WEP special issue show that there are 
many impediments to the study of influence, but there are also some ways to 
get around these in order to design a meaningful study on the impact on 
policy outcomes. Complementarities in the use of categories and differences 
in the research questions addressed will remain the key in advancing the 
literature on interest groups. 
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The perspective of future networking and 
collaboration 
I believe it is fair to conclude that the numerous workshops within Connex 
have brought together people that would otherwise not have known each 
other’s ways of thinking and writing about interest group politics. The 
intensive exchanges and discussions have opened windows and doors to new 
ways of looking and conceptualising, sharpened insight into enduring riddles, 
and laid the basis for future collaborative research. Planning is underway to 
maintain and intensify regular exchange in a more permanent network, and 
promote comparative and collaborative research on interest group politics in 
Europe in the near future. 
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